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Florida Supreme Court Jurisdiction-SUPREME COURT JURIS-
DICTION REVISITED: A LOOK AT FIVE RECENT CASES
On March 11, 1980 Florida voters ratified a constitutional
amendment limiting supreme court jurisdiction.' Ratification of
this amendment created numerous questions which the court must
address.2 In the eighteen months since the amendment became ef-
fectives the Florida Supreme Court has already provided some in-
sight into the extent of supreme court review available since the
passage of the amendment.
The court has recently had the opportunity to address three as-
pects of its jurisdiction. First, the court has defined, to a limited
extent, the boundaries of conflict of decision review.4 The court has
also addressed the review of questions certified by a district court
of appeal to be of great public importance. Finally, the court has
declined the opportunity to determine the scope of discretionary
review once review is granted.
This note will consider each of these areas in order to present a
current view of supreme court jurisdiction.6 An attempt will be
1. The constitutional amendments were placed on the ballot of a special election that
was held March 11, 1980. The official vote was 940,420 to 460,266. England, Hunter & Wil-
liams, Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 U.
FLA. L. REV. 147, 160 (1980) (citing the unofficial certificate of Secretary of State) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Jurisdiction]. The text of the amendment provides in pertinent part:
SECTION 3. Supreme Court.-
(b) JURISDICTION.-The supreme court:
(3) May review by tetio mi any decision of a district court of appeal
that expressly declares valid a state statute, or that expressly construes a
provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a
class of constitutional or state officers, tlhat pase upvn a questui crifd
by a dishc. cutu. of appea to be of peat public inteev , or that expressly
and directly conflicts ha. is n dizct cl.. with a decision of another any
district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of
law, tun any ni*tcluta uLuAy urue. paarnn 5 upvie a hattel Wmhic upon /il
wiso c.,r t n r tui;~ cmiinsetalished by, grumcat law hnvin 5 ,,atic-
Wide j isdictu m.
(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes
upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is
certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another district
court of appeal.
Fla. SJR 20-C (Spec. Sess. 1979).
2. See generally England & Williams, Florida Appellate Reform One Year Later, 9 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 223 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Reform].
3. The amendments took effect April 1, 1980. 1980 Fla. SJR 20-C.
4. Id. at § 3(b)(3) (1980 amendment).
5. Id. at § 3(b)(4).
6. This topic has been analyzed extensively by Justice England in his two articles cited
previously: Jurisdiction, supra note 1 and Reform, supra note 2. Therefore, this note will
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made to determine whether the plain language and underlying
objectives of the constitutional amendment support the court's de-
cisions.7 In addition, the impact of these decisions will be analyzed
to project a pattern for the future. Whether the court will continue
to judicially expand or limit the jurisdiction established by the
amendment remains to be seen.
A. Section 3(b)(3)-Conflict of Decisions
The court has given its most thorough attention to conflict of
decisions review.3 Decisions from different districts must "ex-
pressly and directly"' conflict for the supreme court to have juris-
diction. The avowed purpose of the "expressly" requirement was to
relieve the court's overburdened docket by overruling Foley v.
Weaver Drugs, Inc.10 In Foley, the court allowed conflict certio-
rari1 based on a district court's per curiam affirmance (P.C.A.).'3
Under section 3(b)(3) of the amendment, conflict review may no
longer be predicated on a P.C.A. This is true even if the P.C.A. is
accompanied by a significant dissent."
The Florida Supreme Court has extended this restrictive view to
citation P.C.A.'s" by its decision in Dodi Publishing Co. v. Edito-
rial America, S.A. 15 In a citation P.C.A., another case is cited to
explain the court's reasoning. The Dodi court refused to review the
not attempt to discuss the intricacies involved in the 1980 constitutional amendment. It will
merely provide the reader with an analysis of supreme court decisions subsequent to those
discussed in Justice England's articles.
7. See notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text.
8. Three of the court's five most recent decisions impacting on jurisdiction are cases
defining conflict of decision review. See text accompanying notes 14-74, infra.
9. See note 1, supra.
10. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965). Foley set out the principle that the supreme court would
review no-opinion decisions by the district court. Because no district court opinion is writ-
ten, consideration must be based on the written record of the proceedings in the trial
court-the "record proper doctrine." Foley increased the court's caseload significantly as
attorneys began to seek review of any district court decision. Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at
152. Moreover, review of the court record was a time-consuming task compounding the
problem of delay resulting from the increased caseload.
11. Petition for certiorari is no longer the method to seek review. See 1980 Fla. SJR 20-
C. "Certiorari is essentially a common law writ issued by a superior court to an inferior
court for the purpose of bringing up the record to determine whether the inferior court
exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to proceed according to the essential requirements of law."
Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 181 (footnote omitted).
12. 177 So. 2d at 225; Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 177.
13. Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).
14. A citation P.C.A. is a per curiam affirmance containing only a citation of authority.
Reform, supra note 2, at 179.
15. 385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980).
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cited case to determine whether it conflicted with a decision of an-
other district court of appeal. The court denied jurisdiction, hold-
ing that the conflict must exist between the case for which review
is sought and that of another district. No review of the cited case
will be performed to determine if there is a conflict.16
Robles Del Mar, Inc. v. Town of Indian River Shores,17 however,
decided the same day, left a chink in the armor of Dodi's denial of
conflict review for citation P.C.A.'s. The language in Robles im-
plied that if the cited authority in a citation P.C.A. is not final the
case may be reviewed. 8 In Jollie v. State,1 9 the supreme court
turned this implication into fact.
Jollie was a P.C.A., citing the Fifth District Court of Appeal's
decision in Murray v. State.0 Murray held that requested jury in-
structions were mandatory." The trial court had not given the re-
quested jury instruction. Nevertheless, the district court affirmed
Murray's conviction, holding that the failure to give the requested
instruction was harmless error." Thereafter, the same district
court summarily disposed of three cases23 dealing with the same
legal issue. Jollie was one of these cases. Each case cited Murray
for authority. The holding, if not the outcome in Murray, however,
was in conflict with a First District Court of Appeal case, Tascano
v. State, which had held that the same jury instructions were not
mandatory.2 4 The Florida Supreme Court had already accepted
certiorari in Tascano because the district court had certified the
question as one of great public importance.2
Petitions for certiorari were subsequently filed in the supreme
court for Murray, Jollie, and the other P.C.A.'s citing Murray.
Conflict of decision was the jurisdictional peg cited in each of these
16. Id.
17. 385 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1980).
18. "The cited Epifano decision ... is a final decision of the district court." 385 So. 2d
at 1371 (emphasis supplied). The court then dismissed the petition citing Dodi as authority.
The only interpretation of Robles which will give the word "final" some meaning is one
which allows review of a P.C.A. where a cited authority is not final. See Reform, supra note
2, at 234.
19. Jollie v. State, 6 F.L.W. 555 (July 30, 1981).
20. 378 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
21. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.390(a) states that the judge "shall" instruct the jury on the maxi-
mum and minimum sentences which may be imposed for the crime with which the defen-
dant is charged.
22. 378 So. 2d at 112.
23. Jollie v. State, 6 F.L.W. 555; Allen v. State, 380 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Knight v. State, 379 So. 2d 10, 17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
24. 363 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
25. Id. at 407.
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petitions. Unlike the other cases, however, Jollie's petition was
filed after the effective date of the 1980 amendment.26
The supreme court granted jurisdiction in Murray on a direct
conflict with the Tascano decision.27 The court also granted juris-
diction to the citation P.C.A.'s filed prior to the amendment. Upon
review, the court quashed Tascano, holding that the requested jury
instruction was indeed mandatory.28 Notwithstanding this holding,
the court also quashed Murray.2 9 It held that the district court's
holding-that the failure to instruct was harmless error-was in-
correct.30 The court then granted relief in the two citation P.C.A.'s
filed prior to the amendment."1
In resolving Jollie, the court made use of the "final" language in
Robles. The language of the holding in Robles had left open the
question whether the Florida Supreme Court can grant conflict re-
view of a citation P.C.A. in which the cited case is pending review
or has previously been reversed by the supreme court.3 2 Determi-
nation of this question was necessary to protect Jollie from unjust
treatment by refusing review. Although Jollie is indistinguishable
from the other two citation P.C.A.'s in which relief was granted,
the petitioner would not have received relief because his petition
was filed after the effective date of the amendment.
The Jollie court stated: "[A] district court of appeal per curiam
opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is ei-
ther pending review in or has been reversed by this Court contin-
ues to constitute prima facie express conflict and allows this Court
to exercise its jurisdiction."' 3 By wording its decision in this man-
ner the court has not created an express exception to the amend-
ment. Nevertheless, by this redefinition of conflict the court has
reopened the jurisdictional gate to review of per curiam opinions.
The court advanced two reasons for its decision to enlarge the
power of review. First, the court had traditionally reviewed citation
P.C.A.'s when the referenced decision had been reversed or
quashed by the supreme court prior to Foley, and the court felt it
should continue this policy. After all, the "Court must acknowl-
26. 6 F.L.W. at 555.
27. Murray v. State, 403 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1981).
28. 393 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 1980).
29. 403 So. 2d at 418.
30. Id. To hold otherwise would overrule the mandatory effect of the jury instruction
rule.
31. 401 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1981).
32. Reform, supra note 2, at 234, 235.
33. 6 F.L.W. at 556.
CASE NOTES
edge its own public record actions in dispensing with cases before
it."5 4 Second, the court justified its decision because of the conve-
nience of allowing a court to dispose of cases involving a single le-
gal issue by authoring one opinion and referencing other cases to
it. "Being time and labor saving for a court, [this] practice should
not be discouraged."35
In addition to these justifications, the supreme court directed
that the district courts find ways to isolate P.C.A.'s which refer-
ence a case for authority for possible review decision. P.C.A.'s
which reference a lead case should be labeled differently from
P.C.A.'s which cite cases merely to notify counsel of the court's
reasoning." The procedures requested by the court to isolate these
cases are twofold. First, each citation P.C.A. which references a
controlling contemporaneous or companion case should include a
statement that an order will be withheld pending final disposition
of the controlling case. Second, the court asked that the district
courts devise signals which distinguish a reference to a lead case
from one intended to notify counsel. 8
Thus, Mr. Jollie was protected from inequitable treatment by an
expansive judicial interpretation of the amendment. But what of
the integrity of the language and the purposes of the amendment?
Why should Mr. Jollie be protected while others who receive cita-
tion P.C.A.'s are not? Has the court let a hard case make bad law?
Although Jollie's reach is limited, the decision represents a re-
treat from the 1980 amendment. Several judicial considerations
militate against this retreat and the court's position in Jollie.
First, the plain language of the amendment contradicts the Jol-
lie holding. Generally, where provisions of the constitution are
plain and unambiguous they should be read and enforced as writ-
ten.39 On the other hand, a literal interpretation should not be
used "if it leads to an unreasonable conclusion or a result not in-
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. A counsel advising case is one which is included in a citation P.C.A. to explain to the
attorneys involved the reasons for the court's decision. It does not serve as a discussion of
the legal issues involved or as precedent. Its purpose is merely to inform counsel.
37. 6 F.L.W. at 556.
38. Id.
39. City of St. Petersburg v. Briley, 239 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970); State v. Florida State
Improvement Comm'n, 47 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1950); City of St. Petersburg v. Continental Can
Co., 151 So. 488 (Fla. 1933); Plante v. The Florida Comm'n on Ethics, 354 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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tended by the lawmakers.' 40 The language in section 3(b)(3) is
clear and unambiguous and does not lead to an unreasonable
conclusion. 4
In addition, the term "expressly" as used in the amendment re-
quires that there be some verbal representation. A decision cannot
expressly conflict with that of another district unless an opinion
discussing the legal issues is filed.42 The holding in Jollie simply
does not comport with this requirement. The second drawback of
the Jollie holding is that in Jollie the underlying objectives of the
amendment are compromised. There were several expressed pur-
poses of the amendment. The first was to make the district courts
courts of final appeal and thereby reduce the docket and workload
on the overburdened Florida Supreme Court.43 A second purpose
was to insure that only important legal issues reach the supreme
court."" A third purpose was to insure speedier, less costly, and
more conclusive adjudications. 45 In addition, "the change was mo-
tivated in part by a desire to preserve the resources of the Court
for the task of maintaining harmony and uniformity of decisions as
legal precedents.' 4 6
More specifically, the purpose of adding "expressly" was to pro-
hibit review of P.C.A.'s and citation P.C.A.'s. 47 Post-amendment
cases had continued to narrow the review of P.C.A.'s, thereby di-
minishing the court's caseload. Jollie, however, reverses this
trend.'8
Despite the court's attempt to limit the review of citation
P.C.A.'s, a hole has been opened in the amendment. 49 As noted by
Justice England, "the treatment of [Jollie], . . . and the court's
methodology for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable cita-
tion P.C.A.'s. . . will have significant impact on the court's future
40. 239 So. 2d at 822 (citation omitted).
41. See note 1 supra, for text of section 3(b)(3).
42. See 6 F.L.W. at 557 (Boyd, J., dissenting). Justice Boyd uses Webster's Third New
International Dictionary to define expressly.
43. Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 153, 161, 182.
44. England, Hunter & Williams, An Analysis of the 1980 Jurisdictional Amendment,
24 FLA. B.J. 406 [hereinafter cited as Analysis]; Reform, supra note 2, at 224; Jenkins v.
State, 385 So. 2d at 1358.
45. Reform, supra note 2, at 223; Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d at 1363.
46. Jollie v. State, 6 F.L.W. at 557 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
47. Reform, supra note 2, at 231; Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 179.
48. See, e.g. Dodi Publishing Co. v. Editorial America, 385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1981); Ro-
bles Del Mar, Inc. v. Town of Indian River Shores, 385 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1981); Jenkins v.
State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).
49. Jollie v. State, 6 F.L.W. at 557 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
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caseload and thus the effectiveness of the 1980
amendment .. ."50
As a result of Jollie, the court may lose many of the advantages
it had hoped to gain under the amendment. It is difficult to distin-
guish between citation P.C.A.'s which reference a case pending re-
view and those which merely notify counsel. Although the court
does request that district courts use some type of signal to identify
a case which is subject to review, each citation P.C.A. for which
review is sought will have to be screened at the supreme court
level. The clerk of the court will no longer be able to perform a
ministerial screening as required by the supreme court operating
manual51 to ascertain whether petitions are supported by a written
opinion. 2 It is not yet clear whether the procedures delineated by
the court to isolate acceptable citation P.C.A.'s are sufficient. Since
the procedures are neither mandatory nor particularly precise, at
least some jurisdictional review will be required. The court also
loses the advantage of a "better basis for making an informed deci-
sion,"5 which is present when the appellate court writes an opin-
ion as supposedly required by the amendment for jurisdiction.
Finally, since the court is trying to maintain harmony and uni-
formity of decisions as legal precedents as well as ensure that the
court will review only important legal issues, 4 these cases do not
warrant review. By resolving the cited authority, the court will pro-
vide a uniform legal precedent and thereby perform its policymak-
ing function. If the cited case is reviewed, the question at issue will
have a definitive answer. Supreme court review of citation P.C.A.'s
will add nothing to the precedent developed. Moreover, citation
P.C.A.'s do not stand as precedent.55 If the supreme court does not
review them, they will neither prejudice future litigants nor upset
the precedent created by the court's review of the cited authority.
Review also imposes high costs in court time and effort. Thus, the
50. Reform, supra note 2, at 235.
51. Reform, supra note 2, at 237 (citing Sup. Ct. Manual of Inter. Oper. Proc. art. II,
A(1)(a) (as amended March 24, 1981)).
52. Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 181. The authors state: "The clerk's office will be able
to screen petitions to ascertain if they are supported by a written opinion of a district court,
and those without such support will simply be returned to the filing attorney." Id.
53. Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 181. "A written opinion of the district court on the
point of law sought to be reviewed is now an essential predicate for supreme court review."
Id. at 179 (footnote omitted).
54. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. See also, Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d at
1363 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
55. Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 179, n.187. (citing P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M.
ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL, 33, 39-40 (1976)).
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court should not have created the Jollie loophole.
Another interesting jurisdictional determination involving cita-
tion P.C.A.'s and conflict of decision review was presented indi-
rectly in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Law-
rence.56 In a P.C.A. the district court cited a case for authority and
then added a second citation sentence: "Contra, McLellan v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979). ''6
The jurisdictional question was "whether a 'contra' signal is suffi-
cient to establish a jurisdictional basis for review on the ground of
an 'express' conflict." 8
The supreme court in Lawrence did not, in fact, review the dis-
trict court decision since the conflict had already been resolved.69
Implicit in the majority's statement that the conflict had been re-
solved is the conclusion that the court did have jurisdiction. Other-
wise the court would have denied review for lack of an express con-
flict without concluding that the legal issue was already decided.
This represents a further retreat from the purposes of the amend-
ment. Justice Boyd, in dissent, stated: "The statement that the
conflict has been resolved in a recent or simultaneously issued de-
cision of this court presupposes that there was conflict adequate to
support the exercise of jurisdiction."80 In addition, Justice Alder-
man stated simply that he would dismiss for lack of jurisdiction."1
Thus, once again the court has opened the gate to review of no-
opinion decisions, in contravention of the language and objectives
of the amendment.
Both Jollie and Lawrence represent small cracks in the floodgate
of the 1980 amendment and the subsequent cases which narrowly
construed the amendment. As with most small cracks, they may
begin to expand and eventually tear down the floodgate. Unfortu-
nately, these decisions have seriously undermined the effectiveness
of the amendment. However, not all of the recent decisions regard-
ing conflict review have been expansive in effect. In a third case
dealing with conflict review, Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis,62 the court
attempted to clarify the "expressly" requirement in section
56. 401 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 1981).
57. Id. at 1327.
58. Reform, supra note 2, at 235, n.68.
59. 401 So. 2d at 1326. The court stated, in response to the application for review: "De-
nied, conflict resolved in South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Kokay, 398 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1981)." Id.
60. Id. at 1327 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1326 (Alderman, J.)
62. 401 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1981).
CASE NOTES
3(b)(3).6
The trial court, upon Ford's motion, vacated a jury verdict en-
tered for Kikis and directed a verdict for Ford. The district court
reversed and instructed the trial court to reinstate the jury ver-
dict.64 Ford asserted an express and direct conflict and requested
supreme court review. The district court, however, had not identi-
fied a conflict in its opinion. This omission raised the question of
whether the district court itself must expressly identify a conflict-
ing decision. 5
The court concluded that "[it is not necessary that a district
court explicitly identify conflicting district court or supreme court
decisions in its opinion in order to create an 'express' conflict
under § 3(b)(3)."" The intermediate court's discussion of the legal
principles provided a sufficient basis for conflict review.
The Kikis decision is clearly justifiable. Neither the framers of
the amendment nor the voters intended to require identification of
conflicting decisions by the district courts. If that were the intent,
then sections 3(b)(3) and 3(b)(4) 7 would have the same meaning.
The district court already must expressly identify conflicting deci-
sions to predicate review under certified conflict in section 3(b)(4).
It would be redundant to require this identification for section
3(b)(3) as well. Common sense and canons of constitutional con-
struction will not allow this strained interpretation. Constitutional
provisions should be considered in pari materia and each provision
construed so that it has an effect.6 8 Thus the only plausible con-
struction of sections 3(b)(3) and 3(b)(4) mandates the holding in
Kikis.69
In addition, there is an important advantage in the Kikis hold-
ing; the court eliminates an element of the district court's discre-
tion in determining which cases may seek supreme court review.
Prior to this decision, a district court could, arguably, avoid review




67. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4). See note 2 supra.
68. Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974) (construing provisions
of FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) and (b)(3)). "It is a fundamental rule of construction of our
constitution that a construction of the constitution which renders superfluous, meaningless
or inoperative any of its provisions should not be adopted by the courts." Id. at 16. (cita-
tions omitted). See also, Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979); Askew v. Game
& Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 336 So. 2d 556, 560 (Fla. 1976); In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 96 So. 2d 904, 905-06 (Fla. 1957).
69. See Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 179-80, 189.
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by not identifying an express and direct conflict. This can no
longer be done. Although the district courts may still avoid review
by issuing P.C.A.'s and citation P.C.A.'s to the extent allowed
under Jollie, the opportunity to avoid review by not identifying a
conflict has been firmly closed. 0
B. Certified Question of Great Public Importance-Section
3(b) (4)
The second road to review recently considered by the court is
that of certified questions of great public importance.71 In Petrik v.
New Hampshire Insurance Co. 72 the court addressed the question
of supreme court jurisdiction of a certified public question when
none of the parties sought review on that ground.78
The petitioners in Petrik were passengers in their son's car when
it collided with a dairy truck. A policy provision in the son's insur-
ance contract excluded coverage for bodily injury to the named in-
sured or relatives, thus precluding payment to the petitioners.
Nevertheless, the trial court granted summary judgment against
the son's insurance company, which was a third party defendant,
in the suit between the petitioners and the dairy's insurer.74 The
district court affirmed7 5 and certified the following question as one
of great public importance: "Does a family exclusion clause in an
automobile insurance policy control over the Uniform Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act to prevent one tortfeasor from seek-
ing contribution from another tortfeasor? ' '76 The parties, however,
petitioned for review solely on the basis of section 3(b)(3), alleging
express and direct conflict. None of the parties petitioned for re-
view on the certified question of great public importance. Review
was denied because the supreme court found no conflict, despite
the district court's certification.
The Petrik decision creates an obstacle to supreme court review
70. Id. at 180.
71. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4). Jurisdiction of a certified public question is available
whenever a district certifies a question to the Florida Supreme Court as one involving issues
of great public importance.
72. 400 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1981).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Petrik v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 379 So. 2d 1287, 1290, on rehearing, 379 So. 2d
1290 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
76. Id. 401 So. 2d at 9.
77. Id. at 10.
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of certified public questions.1 Petrik requires that a party must
seek review of the certified question. The court will not review a
decision on the district court's motion.79
The Petrik decision, however, may not be completely consistent
with at least one case decided prior to the jurisdictional
changes-McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co.80 Although McLeod was de-
cided prior to the constitutional amendment, it most likely re-
mains applicable. The sole change incorporated by the amendment
is that "importance" has replaced the term "interest," perhaps re-
sulting in a slight broadening of the issues accepted for review.81
In McLeod the court felt that consideration of jurisdictional
problems inherent in the petition for certiorari" was unnecessary
because the petition was "buttressed" by a certified question.8
The court, therefore, granted review. The language used by the
court suggests that the petitioner requested certiorari on grounds
other than certified public question.8" Thus, even though no party
actually sought review on the certified question, the court appar-
ently granted review solely on the basis of the certified question. 5
78. A second obstacle is that review of certified public questions, as well as conflict deci-
sions, is at the discretion of the supreme court. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) and (4).
Use of the word "[inlay" means that review under these sections is discretionary. See also
Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 177, 191; Analysis, supra note 44, at 410.
79. Note, however, that once the supreme court granted jurisdiction on the basis of a
certified public question, under prior case law they could review the entire record. Rupp v.
Jackson, 238 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1970). This may no longer be true under the 1980 amend-
ment. Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 182. "Opinions should embrace only the legal issue
which was important enough to persuade the justices to accept the case for review." Id. The
1980 constitutional amendment deleted certiorari review. The court in Trushin v. State, 6
F.L.W. 546 (Fla. July 30, 1981) had the opportunity to decide that review is available only
on the issue which served as the jurisdictional peg. The Trushin decision, however, was
ultimately decided on other grounds.
80. 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
81. Jursidiction, supra note 1, at 192. Thus, the McLeod decision would not be affected
by that broadening.
82. Review based on a petition for certiorari is no longer available. Fla. SJR 20-C.
83. 174 So. 2d at 736.
84. "Since the petition for certiorari is buttressed by the certificate of the Court of Ap-
peal, we proceed directly to the merits without a preliminary consideration of jurisdictional
problems." Id. This language appears to distinguish between McLeod's petition for certio-
rari and the grounds stated therein and the court's certification. If the petition had included
the certified question as one of its grounds for review, it is unlikely that the court would
have spoken of the petition being "buttressed" as it did.
85. Supreme court jurisdiction must be founded on one accepted method of obtaining
review. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b). The language of the amendment requires only one juris-
dictional peg. Two methods of review which are only partially satisfied do not add up to the
required peg. Thus, if the court found it unnecessary to review the jurisdictional problems
in the petition for certiorari because of the certified question, the certified question must
have been sufficient alone to grant jurisdiction.
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This review without assertion by a party appears inconsistent
with Petrik's conclusion that a party must actually seek review of
the certified public question. Petrik, however, reflects the court's
current intent to require parties to request review of a certified
question before the court will grant review.
C. Scope of Discretionary Review-Deletion of "by certiorari"
The supreme court was recently presented with the opportunity
to construe the scope of review since the deletion of "by certiorari"
by the 1980 amendment.8 6 Former section 3(b)(3), certiorari re-
view, was based on the common law definition of certiorari.8 Upon
issuance of a common law writ of certiorari from a superior to an
inferior court, the record was brought to the superior court for a
determination of whether the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction
or neglected to comply with essential requirements of law." The
impact of bringing up the entire record under common law princi-
ples of certiorari was that the court could review all meritorious
issues presented in reviewing the full record.
In Trushin v. State,89 the defendant promised to prepare a free
will for each person pledging to support certain judges in a runoff
election. This promise lead to his conviction for vote buying.90 The
defendant challenged his conviction on four grounds, none of
which were raised at trial. The district court decided three of the
issues which were presented and certified the case to the supreme
court as one "involving issues of great public importance concern-
ing the validity and interpretation of section 104.061(2). ' '91
The supreme court accepted review using the certified question
as the jurisdictional peg.92 The respondent argued that the court
could consider only the peg issue because of the deletion of "by
certiorari" in the 1980 amendment. Review of the other issues inci-
dentally presented by the petitioner was therefore argued to be im-
permissible.9 3 The court was thus presented with the question of to
what extent, if any, deletion of "by certiorari" limited supreme
86. Trushin v. State, 6 F.L.W. 546 (Fla. July 30, 1981). See Reform, supra note 2, at 237-
38; Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 182.
87. Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 181.
88. Id.
89. 6 F.L.W. 546.
90. Trushin v. State, 384 So. 2d 668, 679 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
91. Id. at 679 n.28.
92. 6 F.L.W. 546.
93. Reform, supra note 2, at 238.
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court review.
Justice England submitted four potential answers, or levels, to
this question:
The court could, upon acceptance of jurisdiction (1) review the
"peg issue" only-that is, the issue which provides a basis for su-
preme court jurisdiction; (2) review the peg issue and all other
issues which are discussed in the district court decision; (3) re-
view the peg issue and all others presented to the district court
regardless of whether they are discussed in the opinion, or; (4)
review the peg issue and all others presented to the supreme
court, regardless of whether the district court ever had the oppor-
tunity to rule on them.4
The petitioner advocated acceptance of the fourth position since
he was submitting entirely new questions to the supreme court.
The state advocated the first position-the most restrictive view.
The court chose instead to deny review altogether.95
The court felt it would be improper to review three of the issues
presented by the petitioner because they were improperly raised
for the first time on appeal." The court found it more troublesome
to justify its refusal of the certified question. Nevertheless, the
court declined to review the issues encompassed by the certifica-
tion because they were not properly presented to the district court.
The court felt that recognition of the certified questions in this
circumstance "would defeat the purpose of the rule requiring
proper preservation of issues and would empower the district
courts to fashion issues which are hypothetical or are otherwise not
ripe for decision. ' 97 The court noted that "[t]he certification of a
question by the district court cannot resurrect an issue which died
because a party failed to properly preserve it." s
Thus, the Trushin court neatly sidestepped the entire issue of
scope of review. In order to determine the issue of the scope of
review, the court first would have had to accept review on at least
one of the certified questions. Then, by deciding which, if any, of
the other questions raised would receive review, the court would
have indirectly determined whether mere acceptance of jurisdic-
tion permits review of the entire case. The decision rendered by
94. Id. at 237-38.
95. 6 F.L.W. at 547.
96. Id. at 546.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 547.
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the court is proper since it comports with the general rule that
courts should be wary of deciding constitutional questions unless
absolutely necessary. 9  Moreover, the supreme court maintains its
role as a court of review, rather than one of first impression.
In conclusion, the court is taking a divided highway in determin-
ing its jurisdiction. In Jollie, Lawrence and Kikis, the court ex-
pands its power to accept jurisdiction under the conflict of deci-
sions rule. The court may now review some citation P.C.A.'s and
the districts are not required to identify specific conflicts on which
supreme court review may be predicated. In Petrik and Trushin,
on the other hand, the court has read the amendments more re-
strictively and, thus, the review available is more narrow. It is un-
clear which policy will prevail at the end of the road. What is clear,
however, is that the highway will be long and winding.
LISA PRATT
99. Mayo v. Market Fruit Co., 40 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1949). Scope of discretionary review is
a constitutional issue. The court, however, was able to decide Trushin on non-constitutional
grounds and, therefore, followed the general constitutional rule requiring that decisions be
made on non-constitutional grounds whenever possible.
